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Abstract 
We examine the effect of varying the number of bidders and units on bid values in multi-unit 
auctions.  Our results suggest that the uniform-price auction is sensitive to demand reduction, 
however, increasing the number of bidders or/and units can significantly decrease it.  
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An increasing number of products are being sold in auctions (Krishna, 2010).  Hence, 
auctions are now an important way to organize markets.  Although most of the theoretical 
work examines the sale of a single object, many of the most important auctions involve the 
simultaneous sale of multiple identical objects; the so called multi-unit auction (Swinkels, 
2001). In multi-unit auctions, the most common mechanisms used in the empirical 
literature are the uniform-price and the multi-unit Vickrey auctions. The multi-unit Vickrey 
auction is a generalization of the single-unit second price auction. In this mechanism, the 
winner pays an amount corresponding to the sum of the bids (not his or her own) that are 
displaced by his or her successful bids (Krishna, 2010). As the clearing price is not based on 
the winner's bid but on the bids of the other participants, bidding truthfully is a dominant 
strategy in the multi-unit Vickrey auction (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1998). In spite of its 
demand-revealing property, the multi-unit Vickrey auction, however, is not popularly used 
in real auctions due to the complexity of its pricing rule (Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 
2006). 
In contrast, the uniform-price auction mechanism has been used more frequently due to 
its simpler pricing rule.  All winners pay the same price which is equal to the highest 
rejected bid (Krishna, 2010). Nevertheless, the theoretical work by Engelbrecht-Wiggans 
and Kahn (1998) and Ausubel and Cramton (2002) indicated that uniform-price auctions 
can entail a potential problem related to the issue of "demand reduction”. That is, since one 
of an individual’s bids can determine the clearing price (i.e., he or she has to pay for infra-
marginal units), the bidder has an incentive to bid less than his/her values for all units 
except for the first unit, which reduces the seller's revenue and induces economic 
inefficiencies. Hence, demand reduction in uniform-price auction is a serious concern that 
may generate strong inefficiencies and revenue losses. Few theoretical and empirical studies, 
however, have proposed solutions that could reduce demand reduction effects.  Theoretically, 
Swinkels (2001) demonstrated that demand reduction on price reaches zero when the number 
of bidders and units is infinitely high. The use of infinite number of units and bidders in 
real multi-unit auctions is of course unrealistic. Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2006) showed 
theoretically and empirically that for a fixed number of units, the incentives for demand 
reduction in second unit bids weakly decreased when the number of bidders increased but 
did not reach zero in the asymptotic limit.   Nonetheless, it is possible that results may be 
different in auctions involving more than two units. For instance, in a two-unit setting, 
participants may reduce their second-unit bid as this bid can later determine the price that 
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the winner will pay. However, when the number of units is more than two (e.g., 4), we may 
expect higher second-unit bids as the auction price is now determined by a lower-unit bid 
(e.g., the fourth-unit bid).  
To fill this void, we designed an experiment to check the effect of varying both the 
number of bidders (from 2 to10) and the number of units (from 2 to 4) on bidding behavior 
and demand reduction2. We vary both the number of bidders and units to evaluate the effect 
on demand reduction of: (1) increasing the number of bidders keeping the number of units 
fixed; (2) increasing the number of units keeping the number of bidders fixed; (3) increasing 
the number of both the bidders and units; and (4) increasing the number of bidders and 
decreasing the number of units or vice versa.  
Experimental design   
We designed an experiment to investigate the effect of varying the number of bidders 
and units on bid values and demand reduction in multi-unit auctions.3 We conducted an equal 
number of uniform-price and multi-unit Vickrey auctions on identical packets (40g) of a 
product (i.e., organic chips). 160 undergraduate students were recruited and were randomly 
assigned to four treatments. In both mechanisms, we carried out ten sessions of two bidders 
and two units (2_2), ten sessions of two bidders and four units (2_4), two sessions of ten 
bidders and two units (10_2) and two sessions of ten bidders and four units (10_4). No 
subject participated in more than one session.  We conducted the experiment in a computer 
lab using the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Table 1 shows the number of auctions 
run during the experiment.  
We conducted the experiment using a three-step procedure. In step 1, participants were 
invited to a specific computer lab at a specific day and hour. After taking a seat and given a 
welcome address, each participant received an envelope which contained 10€ as 
compensation for their participation, his or her identification number (to be held in secret 
                                                 
2 Compared with previous empirical studies on demand reduction, we did not just vary the number of 
units but we also doubled the number of bidders (i.e., 5 bidders in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. 
(2006) vs. 10 bidders in our case). 
3  Past theoretical studies (e.g., Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998; Ausubel and Cramton, 2002) 
have shown that multi-unit Vickrey auction is demand revealing for all auctioned unit. Due to its 
demand revealing property, we run our experiment following the homegrown value setting of List 
and Lucking-Reiley (2000) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2006) considering bids obtained in the 
multi-unit Vickrey auction as an approximation of individual’s true valuations and, therefore, we use 
it as a reference mechanism. 
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during the process) and a questionnaire designed to collect information on participants’ socio-
demographic characteristics. In step 2, we gave each participant a printed material that 
included an explanation of how the auction works and some examples to illustrate the 
auction. The instructions were identical across all treatments except for auction type and 
number of bidders and units. Given the importance of this step, we informed participants that 
it is very important that they fully understand the auction mechanism. Finally, to further 
permit a better understanding of the auction mechanism and a good familiarity with the 
software, we carried out a training session. Once we were certain that all subjects fully 
understood the auction mechanism and procedures, in step 3, participants were allowed to 
inspect the product and, then, each one of them was asked to submit, via the computer, how 
much she/he is willing-to-pay for each auctioned unit. Once all participants finished reporting 
their bids, the software determined whether the participant was the winner or not and the 
price that he/she had to pay for each unit won. Once the results were announced, the 
experiment ended by handing the product to the winner(s) who had to pay the corresponding 
market-clearing price. In the analysis, we used the Fisher-Pitman permutation test for 
independent samples due to sample size considerations.   
Results and Discussion 
In accordance with the aforementioned theoretical prediction, our results (in 
columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2) show that the first-unit bids in the multi-unit Vickrey 
auction and the uniform-price auction are not significantly different. Furthermore, the 
results exhibited in the third and the fourth column of Table 3 suggests that, in both 
mechanisms, the increase of the number of bidders and/or units did not affect the first-unit 
bids.  
Our results in columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 are generally consistent with the 
aforementioned theory on demand reduction. In fact, we found that, in treatment 2_2, the 
second-unit bid is significantly lower in the uniform-price auction than in multi-unit 
Vickrey auction. However, the possible demand reduction found in treatment 2_2 was not 
found in the other treatment and seems to have been mitigated by the increase of the number 
of bidders or/and units. This explanation is confirmed by the results displayed in columns 5 
and 6 of Table 3. In fact, we found that the variation of the number of bidders or/and units did 
not affect the second-unit bid in the multi-unit Vickrey auction possibly because of the 
incentive compatibility of this auction mechanism. Nonetheless, in the uniform-price auction 
and taking as a base the 2 units - 2 bidders scenario, the results show that an increase in the 
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number of bidders (units) from 2 to 10 (2 to 4) led to a significant increase in the average of 
the second-unit bids from 0.52€ to 0.84€ (0.52€ to 0.72€). We also found that jointly 
increasing the number of bidders and units yielded significantly higher second-unit bids than 
those observed in a 2-bidder and 2-unit setting (0.82€ versus 0.52€) in the uniform-price 
auction.  However, keeping fixed the number of units at 4 and increasing the number of 
bidders from 2 to 10 did not significantly change participants’ second-unit bids in both 
mechanisms.  
Overall, our results suggest three strategies4 that can be used to reduce demand 
reduction effects on second-unit bids in uniform-price auctions: 1) increasing the number of 
bidders (which could increase the level of competitiveness), 2) increasing the number of units 
(which could affect the probability of winning the second unit); and 3) increasing both the 
number of bidders and units (being the number of bidders higher than the number of units). 
Interestingly, our results suggest that an auctioneer in a uniform-price auction can afford to 
be indifferent between increasing the number of bidders and increasing the number of units 
(i.e. treatment 2_4 versus treatment 10_2). This result has an important implication for users 
of uniform-price auction in lab or field experiments. Carrying out a uniform-price auction 
with a high number of participants just to reduce demand reduction can significantly increase 
experimental costs. Another option that could reduce demand reduction but would not 
significantly increase experimental costs is to carry out uniform-price auction with a high 
number of auctioned units.  
Since the fourth-unit bids are the bids that are more likely to determine the clearing 
price in treatment 2_4 and 10_4, we predict more demand reduction in this bid and a 
positive effect of the increase of the number of bidders, especially, in the uniform-price 
auction. As expected, the results exhibited in columns 8 to 10 of table 2 suggest an absence 
of demand reduction in the third-unit bids. However, we found significantly lower fourth-unit 
bids, in treatment 2_4, in the uniform-price auction than in the multi-unit Vickrey auction.  
Interestingly, the bids for the fourth unit in both auction mechanisms are not statistically 
different when the number of bidders is equal to 10. Results displayed in columns 9 and 10 of 
table 3, showed that increasing the number of bidders significantly increased the fourth-unit 
                                                 
4 The first strategy was also suggested by Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2006), the two other 
strategies, however, are based on the present work. 
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bids in the uniform price auction and, hence, mitigated the demand reduction found in 
treatment 2_4. 
Conclusion 
Our study analyzed the sensitivity of demand reduction to greater number of bidders 
and units. Our work suggests a number of important points. First, consistent with previous 
empirical studies, we found that the uniform-price auction (multi-unit Vickrey auction) is 
sensitive (not sensitive) to demand reduction. Departing from a setting of equal number of 
units and bidders, our results suggest that an increase in the competitiveness level (i.e., 
increasing the number of bidders) or the probability of winning (i.e., increasing the number of 
units) can decrease demand reduction in uniform-price auction. Therefore, in accordance with 
the theoretical findings of Swinkels (2001), it seems that running uniform-price auctions with 
relatively large number of bidders and units can be useful in reducing demand reduction 
effects.  Our results also showed that an increase in the number of bidders can significantly 
increase only the bids for the units that are more likely to determine the clearing price (i.e., 
bid for the last units).  
  In summary, while demand reduction seems to be a major obstacle that limits the 
application of uniform-price auction not only as a mechanism to allocate products and 
services but also as a value elicitation method, this can be remedied by generally increasing 
the number bidders and/or units in the auctions.  
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Table 1. Experimental Treatments 
 
Treatment Bidders per auction Units per auction 
Multi-unit Vickrey auction 
sessions 
Uniform price auction 
sessions 
Total subjects 
2_2 
2_4 
10_2 
10_4 
2 
2 
10 
10 
2 
4 
2 
4 
10 
10 
2 
2 
10 
10 
2 
2 
40 
40 
40 
40 
 
Table 2. Average Bids 
 
Treatment 
Bid1 Bid 2 Bid 3 Bid 4 
Vickrey Uniform p-value Vickrey Uniform p-value Vickrey Uniform p-value Vickrey Uniform p-value 
10_2 1.09 1.05 0.79 0.96 0.84 0.55 - - - - - - 
10_4 1.04 0.94 0.33 0.92 0.82 0.39 0.71 0.57 0.25 0.52 0.38 0.25 
2_2 0.89 0.80 0.40 0.73 0.52 0.04 - - - - - - 
2_4 0.94 0.87 0.62 0.76 0.72 0.68 0.56 0.44 0.21 0.42 0.23 0.04 
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Table 3. Effect of Varying the Number of Bidders and the Number of Units on Bids 
Auction format Treatment Bid 1 p-value Bid 2 p-value Bid 3 p-value Bid 4 p-value 
Vickrey 
 2_2 to 10_2 0.89 to 1.09 0.18 0.73 to 0.96 0.17 - - - - 
 2_4 to 10_4 0.94 to 1.04 0.42 0.76 to 0.92 0.15 0.56 to 0.62 0.11 0.36 to 0.53 0.29 
 2_2 to 2_4 0.89  to 0.94 0.72 0.73 to 0.76 0.34 - - - - 
10_2 to 10_4 1.09 to 1.04 0.69 0.96 to 0.92 0.77 - - - - 
 2_4 to 10_2 0.94 to 1.09 0.30 0.76 to 0.96 0.20 - - - - 
 2_2 to 10_4 0.89  to 1.04 0.25 0.73 to 0.92 0.12 - - - - 
Uniform 
 2_2 to 10_2 0.80 to 1.04 0.10 0.52 to 0.84 0.03 - - - - 
 2_4 to 10_4 0.87 to 0.94 0.57 0.72 to 0.82 0.36 0.35 to 0.43 0.26 0.23 to 0.38 0.22 
 2_2 to 2_4 0.80 to 0.87 0.48 0.52 to 0.72 0.02 - - - - 
 10_2 to 10_4 1.04 to 0.94 0.52 0.84 to 0.82 0.89 - - - - 
 2_4 to 10_2 0.87 to 1.04 0.32 0.72 to 0.84 0.44 - - - - 
2_2 to 10_4 0.80  to 0.94 0.09 0.52 to 0.82 0.01 - - - - 
 
 
 
